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Voting data from city-councillors, state and federal deputies elections are analyzed and considered
as a response function of a social system with underlying dynamics leading to complex behavior.
The voting results from the last two general Brazilian elections held in 1998 and 2000 are then
used as representative data sets. We show that the voting distributions follow a generalized Zipf’s
Law which has been recently proposed within a nonextensive statistics framework. Moreover, the
voting distribution for city-councillors is clearly distinct from those of state and federal deputies in
the sense that the latter depicts a higher degree of nonextensivity. We relate this finding with the
different degrees of complexity corresponding to local and non-local voting processes.
89.75.Da, 05.65.+b,89.65.-s
I. INTRODUCTION
The quantitative analysis of data generated by com-
plex systems is a standard problem in statistical physics
that encounters applications is several branches of natu-
ral and social sciences. Quite frequently, the statistical
analysis reveal the emergence of power-law distributions
as a signature, indicating that these systems self-organize
into a critical state with no characteristic length or time
scales. Recently, several scale-free phenomena have been
reported to occur in social sciences, as for example, in
city morfologies [1], economic activity [2,3] and linguis-
tics [4,5], among others.
One of the most fundamental processes in democratic
societies concerns to elections. The future development
of a human democratic organization is strongly depen-
dent on the results of a series of such processes. There-
fore, several efforts have been made to understand the
way people make their choices [6] and what social, eco-
nomic and political features are relevant in such a way
to influence, or even determine, the general outcome
of a particular electoral process. From the statistical
physics point of view, the result of an electoral process
can be considered as a response function of an interact-
ing and open many-particle system governed by an intri-
cate (and even unknown) internal dynamics. After the
seminal work of Bak et al. [7], there has been a gen-
eral believe that these systems usually evolve towards a
critical state whose response functions depict no char-
acteristic scales. As such, the distribution function re-
lated to any stochastic quantity of interest must display
asymptotic power-laws. Further, these power-law distri-
butions must be quite robust depending only on a few
general requirements. In equilibrium critical phenom-
ena the relevant features are related to the symmetry
of the local variable, the space dimensionality and the
range of interactions. However, in self-organized dynam-
ical systems further symmetries may become relevant.
Therefore, a quantitative study of the distribution func-
tions obtained from distinct electoral processes and their
consequent classification is a fundamental step towards a
better understanding of the underlying dynamics.
In 1999, Costa Filho et al. reported an extensive analy-
sis of the proportional elections held in Brazil in October
1998 [8]. They have shown that the distribution of votes
among candidates for state deputies follows a Zipf-like
[4] power-law, N(v) ∝ v−α, with α ≃ 1.0, extending over
two orders of magnitude. Here N is the number of can-
didates that received the fraction of votes v. This fact
reveals that the electoral process indeed displays features
of a scale-invariant phenomena. Further they observed
that such scaling law is quite robust, being practically the
same for different states with large social and economic
discrepancies. This therefore suggests that the reported
distribution is characteristic of a particular universality
class associated with the state deputies election process.
The appearance of the 1/v distribution has been inter-
preted in Ref. [8] with the assumption that the success
of the candidates determining N(v) may be described
by a typical multiplicative process [17]. In this way, the
voting fraction of a candidate, v, can be viewed as a
“grand process” depending on the successful completion
of a number n of independent “subprocesses”. These
factors should be intrinsically related to the attributes
and/or abilities of the candidate to persuade voters and
obtain votes more effectively. As a result, one could then
associate with each candidate the probability pi of per-
forming the subprocess i among voters, so that his or her
voting fraction would be v = p1p2 · · · pn. Considering
that pi are independent positive random variables and n
is sufficiently large, we readily obtain from the central
limit theorem that the distribution of v should be ap-
proximately log-normal. In addition, if the dispersion of
the log-normal is sufficiently large, one can observe a 1/v
type of distribution, over a wide range of random variable
values [17].
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In this work we extend the quantitative study of elec-
toral distribution functions by including an analysis of
the results of the proportional elections in Brazil held
in 2000. That year, all states in the country voted to
choose local city-councillors. For comparison, we also in-
clude an analysis of the congressmen and state deputies
elections of 1998. We find that the scaling behavior of
vote distributions for state deputies and congressmen are
the same within some statistical accuracy but quite dis-
tinct from that obtained for the local voting process for
city-councillors. Further, we show that deviations from
the power-law behavior can be well described by a gen-
eralized Zipf’s law which has been recently introduced in
connection with the nonextensive statistical mechanics of
Tsallis [11].
II. GENERALIZED ZIPF’S LAW
Data from the Brazilian general elections held in 2000
were made available through the web site of the Brazil-
ian Federal Electoral Court [9]. All Brazilian cities held
elections for mayor and city-councillor. We consider the
results from the 15 largest (most populated) cities for
the positions of city-councillors. The average number of
votes per candidate is approximately 500. This number
is significantly smaller than the corresponding ones for
the elections of state and federal deputies.
For each city, we normalize the votes of each candidate
by the total number of voters and construct histograms
to give the number of candidates, N , which received a
certain fraction of votes, v. All 15 histograms present
a common form within the available statistical accuracy.
Data from the 15 histograms were grouped in a unique
histogram which is shown as a log-log plot in Fig. 1. The
resulting curve follows very closely the extended form of
the Zipf’s law [10]
N(v) =
A
(1 + Cv)α
, (1)
where A is a normalization constant, C governs the
crossover between the initial plateau and the power-law
regime characterized by the exponent α.
The above law has been deduced within the nonexten-
sive thermodynamic formalism proposed by Tsallis [11]
by means of heuristic arguments based on the fractal
structure of symbolic sequences with long-range corre-
lations [12]. Indeed, the properties of non-linear maps
at the chaos threshold have been widely used to better
understand some features related to interacting many-
particle systems presenting complex behavior. In partic-
ular, the fast exponential dynamics observed in chaotic
regimes can be reproduced by noticing that the phase-
space volume visited by the map follows a simple linear
differential equation in the form
dW (t)
dt
= λW , (2)
where lambda is the Lyapunov coefficient. This behav-
ior is replaced by a slower power-law dynamics at criti-
cal points where long-range correlations develop. In this
case, W (t) satisfies the non-linear differential equation
dW (t)
dt
= λqW
q , (3)
where the exponent q is related to the degree of nonex-
tensivity induced by the underlying long-range correla-
tions. This is the same parameter characterizing the
proper nonextensive Tsallis entropy Sq which evolves at
a constant rate [13]. A similar generalization can be done
to characterize the possible behaviors of the distribution
N(v) [5]. Its exponential decay, expected to hold for un-
correlated processes, can be directly obtained by assum-
ing that N(v) satisfies the first-order linear differential
equation
dN(v)
dv
= −λN . (4)
Further, for long-range correlated processes, the ex-
tended Zipf’s law follows from the non-linear generaliza-
tion
dN(v)
dv
= −λqN
q (5)
which provides
N(v) =
N(0)
[1 + (q − 1)λv]1/(q−1)
, (6)
where the limit of q → 1 recovers the usual exponential
form.
The best fit of N(v) for the city-councillors election to
Eq. (6) is shown as a solid line in Fig. 1 and provides
α = 1/(q − 1) = 2.63 (q = 1.38). The exponent is sub-
stantially larger than the one reported to hold for the
state deputies elections of 1998 [8]. In Fig. 2 we show
N(v) as computed from data of the state representatives
election in the 15 states corresponding to the capitals
considered above. This figure is similar to the one re-
ported in Ref. [8]. After the initial plateau, a power-law
scaling regime sets up with an exponent close to −1.0.
However, one can clearly identify that the scaling regime
breaks down for large voting fractions and a faster de-
cay takes place. This breakdown of scaling invariance,
not seen in data from city-councillors elections, is sim-
ilar to the one reported to be present in linguistics [5]
and re-association of folded proteins [14]. The crossover
to a faster (exponential) decay for large voting fractions
can reflect a lack of correlation among groups of voters
that chose to vote for the same candidate but are lo-
cated in distinct cities. Within the reasoning that leads
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to Eq. (4), this crossover can be reproduced by consider-
ing that N(v) follows a more general equation [14]
dN
dv
= −λN − (λq − λ)N
q , (7)
whose general solution reads
N(v) =
N(0)
[1− λq/λ+ (λq/λ)e(q−1)λv ]1/(q−1)
. (8)
In Fig. 2 the solid line corresponds to the best fit of N(v)
to Eq. (8). From it we estimate λq = 12227.3, λ = 135.1
and α = 1/(q − 1) = 1.03 (q = 1.97). The exponent
α is in perfect agreement with the previously estimated
value.
The difference in scaling exponents appearing in the
Zipf’s law for city and state representatives leads to the
conjecture that local and non-local voting processes have
distinct underlying dynamics governing the voting deci-
sion. For the city representative election, a model based
in the Sznajd model of sociophysics [15] has been pro-
posed to reproduce the exponent α ≃ 1.0 [16]. However,
a model that captures some characteristics of non-local
voting processes would possible require the inclusion of
complex voting decision rules that take into account the
role of parties, economic and social factors as well as long-
range interacting individuals, among others. The natural
question that arises is therefore related to the possibility
of a universal behavior of non-local voting processes and
what factors are relevant in defining the scaling exponent.
In order to test for a possible universal behavior of
non-local voting processes, we collected data from the
National Congress (federal deputies) election results of
1998. Again, we just took the data corresponding to the
same 15 states previously considered. The resulting dis-
tribution is reported in Fig. 3. Notice that a breakdown
of scaling invariance is also observed in this case for large
voting fractions. The best fit to the generalized Zipf’s law
Eq. (8) is shown as a solid line and the fitting parame-
ters are λq = 6774.4, λ = 33.1 and α = 1/(q − 1) = 1.07
(q = 1.93). The similarity between the exponents charac-
terizing the intermediate power-law regime of both state
and federal deputies comes in favour of the conjecture
that non-local voting processes depict a universal scal-
ing behavior. However, the crossover to the exponential
behavior takes place at distinct (non-universal) voting
fractions.
III. CONCLUSION
In summary, here we provide a statistical analysis for
the results of the Brazilian elections for state and fed-
eral deputies held in 1998, and for city-councillors held
in 2000. We show that all regimes of the measured distri-
butions N(v) are well reproduced by a generalized form
of Zipf’s law which has been originally derived within a
nonextensive thermostatistical approach. More precisely,
we find that the voting distribution for city representa-
tives follows Zipf’s law with a characteristic exponent
α ≃ 2.6. Furthermore, the Zipf’s law representing the
data for state and federal deputies exhibits a slower de-
cay with α ≃ 1.0, followed by a non-universal crossover to
an exponential decay which reflects the lack of persistent
correlations at large voting fractions. We therefore con-
clude that the distributions for local and non-local voting
processes are characterized by distinct scaling exponents.
At this point, it is important to emphasize that these
exponents are practically the same among all states ana-
lyzed. This suggests that voting motivations are indeed
similar for different states regardless of economic, social
and political factors. On the other hand, voting motiva-
tions for local (city-councillors) and non-local (state and
federal deputies) voting processes may be quite distinct
leading to the observed qualitatively different results. It
would be interesting to have models of social behavior
able to distinguish between the presently reported scal-
ing behavior of local and non-local voting processes.
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IV. FIGURE CAPTIONS
Figure 1 - Double logarithmic plot of the voting distri-
bution for city-councillors. Data concern to the results of
the Brazilian proportional elections held in 2000 consid-
ering the 15 largest state capitals. The solid line is the
best fit to the Zipf’s law, Eq. (6). The power-law scaling
exponent is α = 2.63.
Figure 2 - Double logarithmic plot of voting distribu-
tion for state deputies. Data concern to the results of the
Brazilian proportional elections held in 1998 considering
the states with the 15 largest capitals. The solid line is
the best fit to the generalized Zipf’s law, Eq. (8). The
power-law scaling exponent is α = 1.03. The crossover to
an exponential decay reflects the lack of persistent corre-
lations at large voting fractions. The scaling exponent
is much smaller than the one characterizing the city-
councillors election indicating that these two processes
have distinct voting decision rules.
Figure 3 - Double logarithmic plot of the voting distri-
bution for federal deputies. Data concern to the results
of the Brazilian proportional elections held in 1998 con-
sidering the states with the 15 largest capitals. The solid
line is the best fit to the generalized Zipf’s law, Eq. (8).
The power-law scaling exponent is α = 1.07. The similar-
ity with the scaling exponent obtained for state deputies
indicates that these two process may be dominated by
the same voting decision rules.
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